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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE NEW MISSING LINK IN THE FIGHT
TO PREVENT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE?
Paul R. Williams* & Meghan E. Stewart†
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the 1990s, the international community saw significant development and utilization of legal frameworks for mechanisms
designed to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. These mechanisms were used in over a dozen conflicts and allowed the international
community to intervene to halt atrocities, punish those responsible for atrocities, provide redress for victims, and work together to prevent such crimes
in the future. Utilized together, these mechanisms have the potential to be
powerful tools against the perpetration of crimes against humanity and genocide.
Humanitarian intervention is a particularly crucial piece in this
emerging mosaic of measures designed to prevent crimes against humanity
and genocide. Since the early 1990s, there has been a significant need for
humanitarian intervention, a need that will likely continue well into the future. For a time, there was also a significant reliance on humanitarian intervention to address many of the worst intrastate and interstate conflicts.
Unfortunately, despite the importance of humanitarian intervention,
the international community is less likely to undertake meaningful and effective humanitarian interventions in the coming years. Future use of humanitarian intervention is limited by both the failure to develop an adequate
legal basis for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and by a number of
geo-political factors that mitigate against any significant humanitarian interventions in the near future. As such, the international community has lost
one of its key tools to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide, thereby weakening its overall ability to address such atrocities.

*
Rebecca I. Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations, American University.
Ph.D., University of Cambridge; J.D., Stanford University. Professor Williams directs the
Public International Law & Policy Group, and in that capacity has advised nearly two-dozen
states during the negotiation of peace agreements and the drafting of post-conflict constitutions.
†
Senior Peace Fellow, Public International Law & Policy Group. J.D., Washington College of Law; M.A., American University School of International Service. With PILPG Ms.
Stewart has advised approximately one-dozen states on post-conflict constitutional reform,
international law, and peace negotiations.
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DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION SINCE 1990
Humanitarian intervention can take many forms, including using
military forces to help deliver humanitarian aid, protect humanitarian aid
operations, protect and defend the victims of violence, and, in some instances, defeat the perpetrators of violence.1
Furthermore, effective humanitarian intervention consists of something more than simply deploying peacekeepers. Too often peacekeeping
missions are not provided ample personnel or material resources or are restricted by a narrow mandate. The missions in Rwanda and Darfur are examples of the challenges such limitations create for interventions. Similarly,
the deployment of peacekeepers after atrocities have occurred does not constitute genuine humanitarian intervention. The purpose of humanitarian intervention is to interpose international military forces into the conflict in
order to either end the conflict or to provide for human security. To be effective, missions must be provided with the resources and mandate to meet
that purpose.
Since 1990, there have been a large number of interventions, as well
as a significant and increasing need for humanitarian intervention. During
that period, there have been at least seventeen humanitarian interventions,
including: northern and southern Iraq, East Timor, Bosnia, Somalia, and
Kosovo.2 Many of those interventions were effective in either halting or
preventing further crimes against humanity and genocide, but many others
were not.
In addition to those conflicts where the international community
deployed forces in an effort to stop the conflict or lessen its consequences,
there were many others that desperately required the intervention of the
international community but did not receive it, including: the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Georgia, Moldova, Chechnya, and Uganda.
In the cases where the international community conducted humanitarian interventions, whether effective or ineffective, international approval
for the interventions was not always easily won. In fact, the international
community is rarely united on such matters. Even where the international
community had clear evidence of atrocities, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo,
members of the international community have grappled with how to respond, often stalling for months or years before conducting effective interventions.

1

Taylor B. Seybolt, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE CONDITIONS
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 39 (2007).
2
Id. at 28.
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THE NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION WILL CONTINUE IN THE
NEAR FUTURE.
Despite the large number of humanitarian interventions since 1990,
the need for future humanitarian intervention has not waned, and will not
wane in the foreseeable future. A number of current conflicts around the
globe warrant international intervention based on their brutality and violations of international law.
In the Sudanese region of Darfur, for instance, government and
government-backed forces have carried out a targeted, organized, and welldocumented campaign of genocide against Darfurian civilians. The campaign has lasted for over four years, and conservative estimates number
civilian deaths at over 200,000, with an additional two million refugees and
internally displaced persons.3 Throughout the campaign the international
community has watched from afar, chastising the Sudanese government, but
failing to take decisive action to stop the attacks on civilians. Even the United States government, which took a stand early on by labeling the campaign
genocide, has failed to match its rhetoric with action. The limited deployment of African Union peacekeepers, which are unable to even secure their
own bases against attacks, and the slow deployment of a limited number of
United Nations (U.N.) peacekeepers does not constitute the basis for a genuine humanitarian intervention. As currently configured, these limited
forces have been unable to stop the ongoing genocide, and are unlikely to be
able to do so in the future.
Similarly, in recent months there have been widespread calls for intervention in Sri Lanka,4 as the longstanding civil war there has resumed
following a short-lived ceasefire. For over twenty years, the LTTE and the
Government of Sri Lanka have fought a brutal civil war in which an estimated 67,000 people have been killed and over half a million displaced.
Despite calls for humanitarian intervention based on the Responsibility to
Protect, it is unlikely that the international community will do more than
simply provide good offices for ongoing negotiations.
In Burma, military leaders have repeatedly used brutal force to defy
calls for democratic reform while their harsh rule has pushed hundreds of
thousands of refugees across the state’s border (the exact number is unknown).5 In 1988, the military killed over 3,000 pro-democracy demonstra3

See Quick Guide: Darfur, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
5316306.stm.
4
See, e.g., Gareth Evans, President, Int’l Crisis Group, Eight Neelam Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture at the Int’l Centre for Ethnic Studies (July 29, 2007),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4967.
5
Chad Bouchard, Thailand Border Bracing for New Burmese Refugees, VOICE OF
AMERICA, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-10-03-voa10.cfm.
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tors. In the fall of 2007, the military launched a brutal crackdown against
Buddhist monks and civilians seeking democratic reform. To quash the protests, the military raided monasteries, beating, torturing, and arresting the
monks en masse.6 The military government has also carried out a long-term
military campaign against numerous ethnic minorities in Burma. Recent
studies utilizing satellite technology have scientifically confirmed ethnic
cleansing of the Karen minority.7
Finally, many analysts predict, and a number recommend, that as
the civil war in Iraq intensifies, the U.S. military may withdraw to four or
five major bases and wait out the conflict. If this were to occur, there will be
a need and call for humanitarian intervention to stop the civil war. It is unclear whether the United States would then redeploy its forces to stop the
civil war.
In each of these cases, the violence, level of brutality, and number
of violations of international law is roughly equal to or greater than those in
prior instances that have received humanitarian intervention; but the prospect of intervention is limited. This is because the international community
has, to date, failed to find an adequate legal framework to justify intervention, and a range of geopolitical factors together limit the ability of the international community to agree to conduct future interventions.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION’S PLACE IN THE MOSAIC DEVELOPED TO
PREVENT CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND GENOCIDE
Since 1990, the international community has come to rely more
heavily on the combined strength of the various mechanisms designed to
prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. In addition to humanitarian
intervention, other mechanisms include: the creation of international criminal tribunals, the progressive development of international humanitarian
law, the expanded jurisdiction of domestic courts to cover violations of international humanitarian law, the development of the political will not to
tolerate such crimes, and the evolution of U.N. institutions and mechanisms
specifically designed to target the prevention of these crimes. In Bosnia and
Kosovo, and many other conflicts around the globe, the international community combined these mechanisms to bring a lasting end to the conflict.
Humanitarian intervention is a particularly important piece in this
mosaic of mechanisms. Where most other mechanisms seek to prevent and
punish, humanitarian intervention is the only means the international community has to utilize military forces during the commission of crimes
6

Seth Mydans, More Deaths in Myanmar, and Defiance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at

A1.
7

Donald G. McNeil, Myanmar’s Descent, Seen From 150 Miles Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2007, at A6.

File: Williams (July 14).doc

2007–2008]

Created on: 7/14/2008 12:50:00 PM

Last Printed: 7/16/2008 10:46:00 PM

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

101

against humanity and genocide to deliver aid, protect civilians, or, in rare
instances, defeat the perpetrators of these crimes. Thus, used effectively,
humanitarian intervention can produce results. For example, analysis of the
effectiveness of international threats in Kosovo shows that use of force,
through humanitarian intervention, was the only way to force Serbia to halt
its military campaign in Kosovo.8
Examples of effective uses of force in Bosnia and Kosovo include:
NATO air strikes in 1995 to prevent further Serbian aggression against
Bosnia; the deployment of an international force (IFOR) on the territory of
Bosnia following the Dayton negotiations; the spring 1999 air campaign
conducted against Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia proper in order to
deter Serbian aggression in Kosovo; and the deployment of the Kosovo
Force (KFOR) to provide security during the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, providing for the interim international management of Kosovo.9
In contrast, examples of ineffective humanitarian intervention in
Bosnia and Kosovo include the 1993–1995 limitation on NATO to strike
only military assets that had fired on civilian targets, rather than any asset in
the unit engaged in the attack, and United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) commanders’ failure to provide air support when it was requested by UNPROFOR forces defending the safe areas around Srebrenica
and Zepa, resulting in a civilian massacre.10
When humanitarian intervention is effectively coordinated with
other mechanisms, the combined pressure of the mechanisms has the potential to operate as a powerful preventative force to stop and avert crimes
against humanity and genocide. Used ineffectively, however, whether
through lack of coordination, lack of understanding, competing political
goals, or similar problems, such efforts can actually exacerbate a conflict,
increasing the very problems these mechanisms are meant to address.11
A key example of the dangers of uncoordinated peacekeeping is the
humanitarian intervention in Bosnia. During the first four years of the war
in Bosnia, the international community failed to adequately support the
peacekeepers mandated with protecting civilians. The peacekeepers were
essentially prohibited from using force except in self-defense.12 Many
commentators argue that the ineffective use of peacekeepers led to the massacre at Srebrenica in August 1995.13
8
9
10
11
12
13

PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE, 28 (2002).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 33–35.
Id. at 153.
Id.
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In a key turn of events, on August 30, 1995, NATO launched limited air strikes against Serbian forces in Bosnia, shedding former limitations on military intervention. The action immediately produced results—
Serbia agreed to key conditions, which they had formerly resisted. In fact,
Slobodan Milosevic credited the air strikes with ending the war. In a conversation with General Wesley Clark shortly after the initialing of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, Milosevic confided that “NATO won
the war. . . . [I]t was your NATO, your bombs and missiles, your high technology that defeated us . . . we Serbs never had a chance against you.”14
Similarly, efforts at peacemaking failed in Kosovo until the international community acted on its threat to use force. Although the United
States and its NATO allies threatened use of force throughout the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, it was not until NATO planes began air strikes
against key Serbian targets that the Serb offensive was halted.15 After seventy days of air strikes, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244,
which established interim international governing structures and terms for
peace in Kosovo.16
As the likelihood of any future humanitarian interventions is bleak,
the international community may see its overall ability to prevent crimes
against humanity and genocide decrease.
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
Despite the fact that the international community has engaged in
over seventeen humanitarian interventions within the past twenty years, the
legal basis for humanitarian intervention is not well settled. Numerous scholars, including Sean Murphy, who tried to establish an overall framework
for the legality of humanitarian intervention, and Michael Scharf, who
sought to establish the legal basis for the case-specific instance of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, have developed potential legal
frameworks. Regardless, the international community has been so uncomfortable with the notion of humanitarian intervention that it has not been
able to adopt either a coherent framework or a case-specific basis for interventions.17

14

Id. at 1572.
Id. at 204–208.
16
Id. at 208.
17
See SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1996); Paul Williams & Michael Scharf, NATO Intervention on
Trial: The Legal Case that was Never Made, 1 HUM. RTS. REV. 103 (2000) [hereinafter
NATO Intervention].
15
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In Bosnia, the legal discussions regarding humanitarian intervention
focused on interpreting the scope of intervention authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. In Kosovo, the discussions shifted away from legal arguments and focused on the moral authority to intervene. In the aftermath of
the two genocidal campaigns in the Balkans, the international community
reflected on the international legal framework for humanitarian intervention
and developed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. Nevertheless,
these legal arguments have not provided states with a comfortable framework within which to act.
Bosnia
During the genocide in Bosnia, despite the clear and repeated authorization by U.N. Security Council Resolutions to use force to stop the genocide and crimes against humanity, the humanitarian intervention faltered.
U.N. member states and the U.N. Secretary-General actively sought to interpret the mandate as narrowly as possible, and in some cases sought to
erode the moral imperative to undertake humanitarian intervention.18
For instance, in a supplement to his 1995 Annual Report, An Agenda for Peace, then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lauded
the “new kind of United Nations operation” developed in Bosnia and Somalia, in which, “even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII
of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between
the warring parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be
identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities.” The report explains that the
Security Council resolutions provide the “United Nations a humanitarian
mandate under which the use of force is authorized, but for limited and local
purposes and not to bring the war to an end.”19
Similarly, the United States and Europe, bogged down by a fundamental misunderstanding of the conflict, openly debated the strategic importance of Bosnia. Within the United States, officials sought to downplay the
violence in Bosnia, disregarding classified intelligence detailing rape camps
and massacres, to avoid the moral imperative to undertake a humanitarian
intervention. The Bush Administration followed a policy that the United
States had no strategic interest in Bosnia, and that European states should
take the lead with regard to the conflict.20 Within France, Great Britain, and
18
Paul Williams & Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law, in WITH NO PEACE TO KEEP:
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND THE WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 34, 35–39 (Ben
Cohen & George Stamkoski eds., 1995); WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 82–83.
19
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, para. 19, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1, A/50/60 (Jan.3, 1995).
20
WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 64.
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other European states, leaders focused on alternative means to end the conflict, such as partition and appeasement, rather than the use of force.21 Britain, in particular, was committed to achieving a negotiated settlement that
would not involve the use of force by the international community, and
therefore was willing to agree to partition as a means of appeasing Serbia.22
Similarly, the French, who saw the Serbs as their traditional allies, tried to
limit the role of international peacekeepers to one of minimizing human
suffering while seeking a negotiated settlement.23 As a result, when the international community finally decided to intervene after the massacre in
Srebrenica, there was no clearly articulated legal basis for doing so.
After the end of the Bosnian conflict, Professor Sean Murphy attempted to make the case for a customary international law of humanitarian
intervention. Surveying state practices since the early 1800s, with a particular focus on interventions in the post Cold War era, Murphy argued for the
establishment of customary international law that allows for humanitarian
intervention in cases of widespread deprivations of human rights.24 Although influential, this legal framework has not been widely adopted by
states.
Kosovo
As the Serbian regime turned from Bosnia to Kosovo and began to
commit crimes against humanity, a handful of legal scholars put forth a series of legal arguments to justify humanitarian intervention. These arguments relied upon U.N. Security Council Resolutions relating to the former
Yugoslavia and emerging customary international law.25 Despite this legal
basis, the international community refused to articulate a legal argument for
the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Reportedly, the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department refused to even provide a legal justification to the Secretary’s Office. France and Germany hesitated at the use of
force without Security Council authorization, and Russia assured Milosevic
that no such authority would be granted.26 In the end, the European Union,
and other states, opted for the rather quixotic argument of “illegal but legitimate.”27
21

Id. at 63–87.
Id. at 72.
23
Id. at 74–77.
24
Murphy, supra note 19, at 34.
25
NATO Intervention, supra note 19, at 104–05.
26
WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 184.
27
INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/thekosovoreport.htm.
22
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In addition to failing to establish a legal basis for intervention in
Kosovo, the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo also served to further confuse the international debate regarding a legal framework for humanitarian
intervention. Not only had NATO carried out air strikes without specific
authority from the Security Council, but it did not even argue that it had
such authority. In the wake of the intervention, legal scholars articulated a
range of new possible legal frameworks for intervention.
In 2002, Jane Stromseth analyzed the four frameworks that emerged
post-Kosovo. The first framework argued that intervention was only legal
when authorized by the Security Council.28 The second argued for “excusable breach,” in which “deviation from the strict letter of the U.N. Charter
will be tolerated in exceptional circumstances.”29 This does not argue a specific framework, but rather an exception that may be judged on a case-bycase basis. The third framework argued for the evolution of customary international law to allow for humanitarian intervention in specific circumstances.30 This approach maintains the central role of the U.N. Security
Council in determining acceptable uses of force while also recognizing the
necessity of force in particular situations. The fourth framework argued for
a right of intervention similar to a right to self-defense under international
law.31 In the end, the third framework became the most prominent in the
form of the Responsibility to Protect.
The Responsibility to Protect
In the face of the tension between the emerging norm of human security and sovereignty, the debate on a legal basis for intervention has now
shifted from humanitarian intervention to the Responsibility to Protect. This
shift transformed the debate from the question of the right to intervene to
one about the responsibility of states to protect innocent lives and the duties
inherent in sovereignty.
In 2001, the Canadian sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, which emphasized a duty inherent in state sovereignty to
safeguard the lives of civilians. The Commission argued that if this duty
was not upheld, other governments, with the authorization of the United
Nations, had the right to act, even to the extent of using military force as a

28

Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232,
241–42 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O’Keohane eds., 2003).
29
Id. at 243.
30
Id. at 244.
31
Id. at 245.
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last resort.32 This report drew upon concepts articulated by others such as
Frances Deng, a Commission member.33
The Commission’s report was soon followed in the report of the
U.N. Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, which endorsed
the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to
protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing,
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law
which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.34

The concept was further endorsed by the United Nations by its incorporation in Koffi Annan’s Report to the U.N. General Assembly In
Larger Freedom, and in the September 2005 World Summit by the U.N.
General Assembly, thus gaining broad international acceptance.35
Despite broad acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect, the international community has failed to find a legal basis in which to seat the concept. The Responsibility to Protect argument essentially adopted the moral
approach of just war theory, but not the legal framework. Interestingly, as
the historical advocates of the just war approach placed “right authority”
with the Pope, those who advocate for a “responsibility to protect” place
that authority with the United Nations.

32

INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 13 (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp.
33
See, e.g., FRANCES DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (1996).
34
Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, Transmittal Letter
2004 from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para. 203,
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004).
35
The Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, para. 4, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar.
21, 2005). “In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private
sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we must ensure
that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds. We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability—the accountability of States to their
citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the
present generation to future generations. Where there is accountability we will progress;
where there is none we will underperform. The business of the summit to be held in September 2005 must be to ensure that, from now on, promises made are promises kept.” Id. at para.
22.
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NUMEROUS GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS MITIGATE AGAINST ANY
SIGNIFICANT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE
In addition to the international community’s failure to adopt a legal
framework for intervention, a range of other factors mitigate against the
chance there will be any significant humanitarian intervention in the foreseeable future. These factors, such as the increasing tension between military forces and humanitarian agencies in conflict zones,36 the fact that an
effective humanitarian intervention requires military resources that few
states possess,37 and the reality that states undertaking genuine humanitarian
intervention can only do so if they have the political will to protect strangers

36

There is an inherent tension between the means and objectives of humanitarian agencies
and the means and objectives of the military, which makes many “humanitarians” uneasy
with supporting military intervention to provide for human security. Catriona Gourlay, Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions, 3
DISARMAMENT FORUM 35, http.//www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art131.pdf. Humanitarian
aid agencies and their staff continue to define their role as non-political and impartial, seeking to minimize violence and treat all sides equally. Id. Military forces, in contrast, take sides
and seek to kill the enemy. Id. This tension is readily evident in the operation of the mix
civilian/military Provisional Reconstruction Teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and has
hampered their ability to accomplish their objectives. Greg Grant, Tension Builds in Iraq,
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.govexec.com/features/1206-01/120601na1.htm.
37
The interventions in both Bosnia and Kosovo consisted primarily of U.S. forces—by
one count over 90% of the sorties made over Kosovo were by American warplanes. STEVE
BOWMAN, KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA: U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4 (2003). With American and British forces preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, the military resources for an
effective humanitarian intervention are simply not available. It may still be possible for
small-scale humanitarian interventions, such as the case of East Timor where the Australians
formed the bulk of the forces. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, TimorLeste, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2008).
Coupled with the lack of capacity is the fact that many conflicts that require humanitarian intervention are simply too remote from states that possess the military capacity to intervene. Richard Caplan, Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward? 14 ETHICS & INT’L
AFFAIRS 24 (2000). The case of the Sudanese genocide in Darfur is often cited as a conflicttoo-far. Despite the fact the United States has declared the conflict in Darfur to be genocide
and the international community has condemned the conflict, no state or alliance seems to
posses the resources to effectively operate in that remote region. See US Convinced of Darfur
‘genocide,’ BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4227835.stm. As
noted above, the A.U. troops the have been deployed seem barely able to defend their own
bases, let alone protect the civilian population or defeat the forces committing genocide.
Darfur Rebels Attacks Base, Kill 10 Peacekeepers, CNN.COM, Sept. 30, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/09/30/darfur.peacekeepers/index.html.
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at the cost of their soldiers’ lives.38 Such factors limit the capacity of actors
to carry out interventions and introduce questions regarding the necessity or
effectiveness of interventions.
Many humanitarian interventions have been ineffective in saving lives
First, and probably most importantly, it is not clear that humanitarian intervention has been particularly effective in protecting human security. Recently, Taylor Seybolt analyzed seventeen humanitarian interventions
and found that just over half of those interventions were actually effective in
saving lives. Dr. Seybolt defines effectiveness as saving more lives than
would have been the case if there were not a humanitarian intervention. Dr.
Seybolt further finds that humanitarian interventions led by the United Nations have generally failed or have achieved only mixed results, while those
led by coalitions or undertaken unilaterally have had much greater success
rates. This leads Dr. Seybolt to the conclusion that the United Nations
should not lead humanitarian interventions.39 The significance of this argument cannot be underestimated, as the United Nations is considered by the
advocates of the Responsibility to Protect as the primary decision-maker
with regard to when the international community can intervene.
The return of big-power politics
The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s were possible in large
part because China was preoccupied with its internal economic transformation and the USSR had dissolved, leaving Russia in a state of economic and
political disarray. China and Russia’s re-emergence as global powers are
likely to chill humanitarian interventions because both have demonstrated a
willingness to wield their Security Council veto to prevent humanitarian
interventions. During the recent crisis in Burma, for instance, China and, to
a lesser extent, Russia have blocked calls for U.N. Security Council action,
arguing that the Security Council is not the appropriate venue to consider
the crisis.40 Similarly, during the height of the genocide in Darfur, China
38

The most striking example of how humanitarian intervention fails when states are unwilling to pay this price is the Srebrenica massacre, where the Dutch peacekeeping forces
stepped aside and allowed Serb forces to massacre over 7,000 civilians. Dutch Government
Quits Over Srebrenica, BBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
1933144.stm. Restrictions by many European governments on their forces operating in Afghanistan, in particular German forces, indicates that many of these states remain unwilling to
commit to the real cost of humanitarian intervention even when they do deploy troops.
SEBASTIAN MERZ, STILL ON THE WAY TO AFGHANISTAN? GERMANY AND ITS FORCES IN THE
HINDU KUSH, SIPRI PROJECT PAPER 8 (Nov. 2007).
39
SEYBOLT, supra note 3, at 270–73.
40
Malaysia Pushes for Burma Talks, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/7032291.stm.
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blocked Security Council action, protecting its close relationship with the
Sudanese government and its oil interests in the country.41 Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russia’s willingness to use those resources as a political lever will further limit the ability of European states to
call for, or participate in, humanitarian intervention.
Preemption on national security concerns.
Although preemption is not the same as humanitarian intervention—nor does it seek the same outcome—its resuscitation by the United
States and other states will likely further inhibit reliance on the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention in coming years. The re-emergence of preemption
as a basis for intervention provides states with a more familiar doctrine on
which to justify military intervention. Notably, the first humanitarian interventions, such as Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda to remove Idi Amin,
relied on preemption based on national security when they could have relied
on humanitarian intervention. Similarly, the recent Ethiopian incursion into
Somalia was also justified on national security grounds.42
Legal institutions that were created to press for justice have been used in a
way to chill humanitarian intervention.
The legal institutions developed to prevent crimes against humanity
and genocide have been utilized in ways that chill the possibility of future
humanitarian interventions. For example, from mid-1999 until June 2000,
the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia undertook an extensive review to determine whether to initiate a
formal war crimes investigation of NATO for acts committed during the
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The review was initiated in response
to complaints from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Russia, and some
Canadian law professors. By most accounts, the review was carried out in
large part to demonstrate that the Yugoslav Tribunal was impartial. Over
one year later, the Prosecutor concluded that no investigation was warranted.43 With the creation of the International Criminal Court, few states
are likely to be willing to undertake a humanitarian intervention, knowing

41
See Roberta Cohen, Calling on China: The China-Darfur Connection, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/cohenr/20040805.htm.
42
Alex Perry, Interview: Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, TIME, Sept. 6, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1659420-2,00.html (arguing the Islamic
Courts Union had declared war on Ethiopia).
43
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo. (ICTY), Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Comm. Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Fed. Republic of Yugo., para. 90, PR/P.I.S./510-E (June 13, 2000).
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that the prosecutor may then launch an investigation simply to demonstrate
impartiality.
The tendency of tribunals, in particular the Yugoslav Tribunal, to
indict individuals from all sides of a conflict out of a need to seem politically balanced has heightened this fear. These indictments tend to confuse the
facts of and rationales for conflicts, however, blurring the line between
criminal and non-criminal acts, and thus eroding the basis for humanitarian
intervention.
The recent International Court of Justice case concerning the genocide committed against Bosnia will likely prove to further chill future humanitarian interventions.44 The decision’s confusing interpretation of the
legal standard for genocide, particularly with regard to establishing an unjustifiably high legal standard needed to prove genocide, will likely influence whether states will intervene to prevent other genocides, including the
current genocide in Darfur.
Question of moral authority
In the current political climate, humanitarian intervention requires a
level of moral authority that few, if any, states or organizations possess.
With the U.S.-led military engagement in Iraq, combined with the tendency
of the E.U. member states to support an approach of appeasement over intervention and the continued controversies surrounding the conduct of U.N.
peacekeepers—ranging from drug trafficking to permitting the Srebrenica
massacre, and standing on the sidelines during the Rwanda genocide—the
few states or organizations that formerly possessed the moral authority to
undertake a large scale humanitarian intervention have eroded that authority, and no new states or organizations have stepped in to fill the void.
CONCLUSION
Humanitarian intervention will soon be the missing piece in the mosaic of mechanisms developed to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide. By failing to establish a clear legal basis for humanitarian intervention, and by failing to shift the manner in which it perceives human security,
the international community has let a valuable tool slip from its repertoire
that could have been used to prevent atrocities.

44
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment (Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf#view=FitH&pagemode=none&search=
%22Bosnia%22.

